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Frank Busta:  Our three panelists are here and it’s time for your questions. 
Kim Nill (US Soybean Export Council):  Dr. Moore, certain countries and certain buyers 
of organic commodities might consider so-called GMOs as adulterants of non-GMO 
commodities. Considering the detection methods, it seems to me to be hopeless because 
virtually all of the relevant genes in biotech products come from soil-dwelling bacteria, 
Bt1 for instance. These commodities are allowed as much as % of what is called foreign 
material. That % could be entirely top soil, so you would have false positives triggered 
by bacteria that just happened to be present. Getting anything approaching a scientific 
determination of what is present strikes me as hopeless. Am I missing something, or is 
there a way around this?
Jeffrey Moore:  Your question speaks to a real challenge in that the more specific and the 
more selective the method, the greater is the chance of false classification, because you 
simply have more and more information making it more difficult to determine whether 
or not something is authentic. ELISA2s, which are used widely do have this very real 
issue of false positives and false classifications. On your question about GMOs, I don’t 
take a stance on that. At USP3, standards are not being developed to differentiate GMOs 
from non-GMOs. I don’t see us doing that any time in the near future, if that’s what 
you were getting at.
Tracy Sides (University of Minnesota):  Yesterday, we heard that, at the beginning of their E. 
coli outbreak, Germany turned to a lab in China rather than to a lab here in the United 
States, which was described as a negative reflection on public funding support. I’m curi-
ous, Dr. Besser, regarding your perspective on that occurrence.
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John Besser:  I was a little mystified as to why China was the first laboratory to sequence 
that organism. I really don’t know the story. Yes, it’s true that our infrastructure is un-
der-funded to keep up with these technologies.  When the cholera outbreak occurred in 
Haiti some months ago, we actually did have that whole thing sequenced within a few 
days.  We threw resources that we didn’t have at it, so it’s possible to do. To answer your 
question: yes, there is an issue but I don’t know why that occurred.
Joseph Msanne (University of Nebraska):  Dr. Moore, are food preservatives considered 
adulterants?
Moore:  There are many cases where they can be, especially where they are not allowed 
for use in food products. Shelf-life extension adds value to it, so it may be considered 
EMA4 or food fraud.
Shaun Kennedy:  There are examples of that being done in which the contaminant poses 
public-health problems. There was a case in China where a company added formaldehyde 
in order to extend the shelf life of tofu.
Hongshun Yang (University of Minnesota):  A question for Dr. Besser…[inaudible]
Besser:  The power of PulseNet is that everybody uses the same protocol and there is a 
certification process for laboratories to become part of PulseNet, to use the brand name. 
So, yes, the results are mostly comparable throughout the world. Unfortunately in the 
0 German outbreak, although we had added a new non-O56 protocol—details of 
which you really don’t need to know—the Germans hadn’t yet adopted it. So, we actually 
couldn’t directly compare the patterns that they were getting with ours. Every attempt 
is made to have uniformity throughout the world so that we can compare—eventually 
instantaneously—one country to another country. The problem with PulseNet Interna-
tional mostly is that the surveillance systems in different countries vary tremendously, 
and, in many countries, surveillance as we know it barely exists. So while countries may 
develop this very robust infrastructure at the national level, they may have very little to 
work with; doctors aren’t ordering tests, laboratories aren’t identifying bacteria, samples 
aren’t being sent to health departments. In order to make this work in much of the world, 
we have to address the underlying public-health infrastructure, which of course is a much 
bigger task. But we actually are doing that through a program called the Global Foodborne 
Infections Network, or GFN, where we are holding epidemiology and laboratory-training 
classes throughout the world. Interestingly, the microbiologists argue a lot about methods, 
but it actually doesn’t matter. You hit upon the really important point that everybody 
should do the same thing, whatever it is. I wish I could clobber the Europeans over their 
heads so that they get that one point. It’s important that we all do the same thing, that 
we speak a common language.
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Jacqueline Fletcher (Oklahoma State University):  I have a question about the response 
of systems that are the same or different when an intentional contamination might be 
involved. Does it change who responds, who takes control and how initial decisions are 
made? And maybe you could put it in the context of the German outbreak. I know that 
people have considered the possibility that that was intentional—there are odd things 
about it—but, as far as I know, there’s no evidence for that.
Besser:  When clusters of disease occur, we don’t know whether they are foodborne if 
we don’t know why they are occurring. We don’t know whether they are intentional or 
natural occurring. In fact, we don’t know anything other than that a cluster of disease is 
occurring. So the initial process is an epidemiological one, attempting to answer some 
of those basic questions. If there’s any hint of intent, then Homeland Security and other 
organizations would quickly come into it and we’d have phone conferences with the 
 Departments of Defense and Homeland Security very early on because of the unique nature 
of this, and they would ask us directly what evidence we have that it wasn’t intentional 
and what level of concern should they have. And we would share with them all of the 
available epidemiologic data to try to assess, to triage the level of concern that we have 
an intentional event. And, in this circumstance, while it couldn’t be ruled out, there was 
no specific intelligence or any specific microbiological data to point towards intentional 
contamination. But this has to be asked every time. We are the gatekeepers because we 
are investigating the clusters and the threshold is pretty low. If there is any concern we 
get the intelligence agencies involved very quickly.  
Kennedy:  In the United States specifically, when it becomes a probable intentional event 
then the FBI becomes the lead agency and Homeland Security becomes the coordinat-
ing agency. Three years ago, we had an exercise on food defense that involved the G8 
countries and, although most of them don’t have an equivalent to Homeland Security, 
the same basic approach applied; as soon as it becomes potentially intentional the federal 
law-enforcement agency takes the lead, which introduces challenges in terms of potential 
differences in investigative protocols between public health and law enforcement. You 
may end up compromising the public-health investigation because you are trying to make 
sure you have an appropriate law-enforcement investigation.
Busta:  And, at that G8 event, the German representatives said they had it all down 
cold.
Jacqueline Fletcher (Oklahoma State University):  .% of outbreaks are unintentional. 
What is the status of research in preparation for types of work that had to go on, say, 
after the anthrax attack to pin down the source—in other words, very detailed, strain-
discriminatory testing, markers and so on?
Besser:  The microbiological aspects are relatively easy to control. We can do whole-genome 
sequencing for about $00 now. Unfortunately, unlike in human DNA sequencing for 
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forensic purposes, as used with OJ Simpson and the bloody glove, the system that we are 
operating in is a lot more complicated. It is sufficiently complex that microbiological data 
alone often don’t tell the story. The natural variation in the bacteria complicates this whole 
concept of microbial forensics. Even with anthrax. Anthrax was a perfect case because it’s 
something that’s at an extremely low prevalence in the population and its presence in a 
human case is indicative of an extraordinary event. When you are talking about things 
that are common, like chicken pox or E. coli, it gets much more complicated. The germs 
are constantly changing on their own, and we actually pick markers that are variable. We 
pick them because they are variable. In the Haiti outbreak, for instance, we sequenced 
sixteen strains; differences occur as it’s passed from person to person so they are constantly 
changing. While it’s an emerging science and we can tell a lot from the germs, it has to 
be a multi-systems approach to get at these issues. The science has progressed, but we are 
running up against a wall; microbiology can’t tell us everything.
Busta:  How would you go about trying to detect whether it was a laboratory-directed 
change in the organism compared to one that’s natural?
Besser:  We haven’t encountered that yet, fortunately, but we can look at the sequence 
level and there are certain natural insertion sites for genes that are well known in the 
molecular biology world. So one can look for insertions of chunks of DNA that might 
not be appropriate. This actually did occur with smallpox, when interleukin- was in-
troduced in Britain, I believe, in the 0s. This was not a bioterrorism event, it was just 
an experiment. I am not a molecular biologist, but I know that there are ways of looking 
for these large insertions and deletions of genes.
Francisco Diez-Gonzalez (University of Minnesota):  It’s been over seven years since then-
US Secretary of Health Tommy Thompson said, “For the life of me, I can’t understand 
why terrorists haven’t attacked our food supply.” What are we doing right, that this hasn’t 
happened?
Busta:  Alright, Shaun?
Kennedy:  Part of it is, they actually have been plotting to try and do something inten-
tionally to the food system and have been caught before they did it. Law enforcement 
has actually gotten lucky a few times. And part of it was touched on yesterday, about the 
psychology and sociology of terrorists—what their motivation is—and right now they 
are satisfying their membership motivation by blowing themselves up in the Middle East. 
Until we are out of Iraq and Afghanistan they are going to be focused there more than 
they will be focused here because their primary goal is to get us out. And attacking us 
here, as they learned from /, doesn’t get us out. It brings us in. 
